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HE FOLLOWING ARTICLE is based on Dallas Fed President
Bob McTeer’s speech to the Japan–U.S.–Southern Conference
in Houston, September 5, 1996.
Texas, New Mexico, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Arkansas and
Mississippi have experienced dramatic changes in the struc-
ture of their populations and economies over the past few
decades. (Throughout this article, these states are referred to as the
South.) Although these states have maintained distinctive cultural
and ethnic identities, their economies have become more similar to
one another’s, as well as to the U.S. economy as a whole. Although
the South’s economy more closely resembles that of the nation, the
regional economy has outpaced the nation’s throughout the 1990s.
This article explores the recent economic performance of these
southern states and the unique characteristics of the region that ac-
count for much of its current strength.
These six southern states have diversified away from resource-
based industries and traditional manufacturing to become more ser-
vice-oriented economies. Charts 1 and 2 demonstrate this shift. In
1970, agriculture and mining combined (which includes oil and gas











The Upside of 
Downsizing
Reexamining the 
Minimum Wagegross state product (GSP). By 1992—the
most current year for which GSP figures
are available—agriculture and mining’s
share of regional output had fallen to 8
percent. Yet over the same period, nar-
rowly defined services, such as health
care, temporary placement services and
computer-related services, grew from
10 percent to 17 percent of GSP. In
Texas alone, oil and gas extraction’s
share of state output was 9 percent in
1970, then peaked at 18.5 percent in
1981, only to fall to just below 7 percent
by 1992. The story is similar in agricul-
ture. For instance, in 1970, agriculture
accounted for 6.6 percent of Missis-
sippi’s GSP but had fallen to 3 percent
of GSP by 1992.
While the South has become less de-
pendent on its natural resource-based
sectors, they still exert a strong influ-
ence on the region’s economy. For 
example, agriculture accounts for a
much larger share of total GSP in New
Mexico, Oklahoma, Arkansas and Mis-
sissippi than in the nation as a whole.
While Texas’ agricultural sector makes
up less than 2 percent of its total GSP,
Texas still has more farmland and pro-
duces more cattle and cotton than any
other state in the nation.
The South accounts for 50 percent of
the nation’s mining sector. In fact, Texas
alone accounts for 27 percent of na-
tional mining output, most of which is
oil and gas extraction. While the na-
tional energy industry has been down-
sizing and consolidating, the increased
concentration has favored Texas and
Louisiana. For example, near the height
of the oil boom in 1981, 47 percent of
all energy industry wages, salaries and
benefits went to workers in Texas and
Louisiana. By 1993, industry consolida-
tion had boosted this figure to 62 per-
cent. In short, the size of the national
energy industry pie has been shrinking,
but the South’s piece is getting larger.
1
Continued diversification of the
southern economies means the region
will be less vulnerable to the cycles 
associated with the energy and agricul-
tural sectors. On the other hand, when
these industries do well, consolidation
will bring the South a greater share of
the benefits relative to the nation.
2
Any comparison of the southern 
region with the United States should 
be qualified by noting that Texas, be-
cause of its size, is overrepresented in
regional GSP, employment and popula-
tion figures. Texas accounts for 60 per-
cent of the South’s combined GSP
(Chart 3) and about 57 percent of its
population (Chart 4). Texas employ-
ment as of June 1996 was 8,256,200—
larger than the combined total of
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Chart 1
Southern Gross State 
Product, 1970
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The slowdown in the national economy
will reduce the present strength of Texas’
economic growth over the next two to
three years.…GSP growth is expected
to slow to 3.2 percent in 1996 from 4 per-
cent in 1995 and to more sustainable
rates of 2.8 percent in 1997 and 2.5 per-
cent in 1998. Employment growth will 
follow a similar trend, falling…to just 
over 2 percent annually in 1997 and
1998. During this time, personal income
growth will slow from 6.7 percent in 1995
to under 5 percent in 1998.…[S]ervices
will continue to be the state’s most 
important sources of new jobs.…
[B]ecause of the slowdown in high-tech
and construction-related industries, total
manufacturing employment will grow
somewhat slower over the next two to
three years than in the recent past.
—Texas Comptroller of 
Public Accounts (July 1996)
New Mexico
The outlook for the New Mexico econ-
omy is moderate at best, with employ-
ment and income growth significantly
below the rates we have recently en-
joyed. Employment growth, which aver-
aged about 4.5 percent annually from
1993 through 1995, is expected to fall to
3.2 percent in 1996 and 1.9 percent in
1997. Personal income growth is also
expected to be subdued, with gains of
5.4 percent this year and 4.5 percent
next year.…The services sector will
likely remain fairly robust…while trade
and manufacturing will enjoy moderate
employment growth. Growth in construc-
tion and government employment, how-
ever, will be weak.
—University of New Mexico, 
Bureau of Business and 
Economic Research (1996)6,013,600 jobs in the region’s five other
states.
Southern Economies
Outpace the Nation in the 1990s
The United States began the 1990s
with negative employment growth as a
result of the 1990–91 recession. Chart 5
shows that the southern states weath-
ered this downturn much better than
the rest of the nation, with positive 
annual employment growth over the
period. The chart also shows that as the
1990s have progressed, each state in the
region has continued to outpace the 
nation. What is the source of this
growth? In general, the South continues
to benefit from resource-based sectors
like energy and agriculture, but the re-
gion has developed several new
strengths as well.
As Table 1 shows, growth in services
and construction in all six southern
states’ economies has exceeded the 
national average. The growth in these
sectors has been fueled by rapid popu-
lation growth in the South—much of it
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Chart 3
Southern States’ Share of 
Regional Output, 1992
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Southern States’ Employment Growth Exceeds the Nation’s

















SOURCES: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas; Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Louisiana
The Louisiana economy will pick up an
additional 66,000 jobs between now and
1998. Our growth rate will average about
1.8% a year.…[D]espite setbacks in 
textiles and apparel and the health care
industry, the state’s economy will con-
tinue its record setting pace.…[T]ech-
nological advances and unusually
productive fields in the Gulf [will help]
the extraction industry to add another
2,300 jobs over the next two years.…
Louisiana will gain manufacturing jobs
over 1997–98, a trend that is counter to
trends at the national level.
—Scott et al. (1996) 
Louisiana State University
Oklahoma
Real Gross State Product…is predicted
to grow by…2.6 percent during 1996 on
the basis of strong national stimulus and
continuing trends and structural adjust-
ments.…This expansion of economic
activity is expected to generate at least
an additional 30,000 nonagricultural
wage and salary jobs and combine with
higher nonearnings forms of income
(i.e., profits, dividends, rents, and inter-
est) to see an increase of total personal
incomes of 4.6 percent.…As usual, job
growth will be almost totally in the
broadly defined service industries. Re-
tail trade, health services, and business
services account for the majority of
growth.
—Oklahoma State University, 
College of Business 
Administration (1996)from relocations, as well as high birth
rates due to its relatively young popu-
lation and immigration. Population
growth tends to benefit homebuilders,
home furnishings suppliers, retailers
and service providers, which in turn
tends to encourage further increases in
population as these sectors draw firms
and workers from other states and
countries. Another factor boosting the
expansion of the service and construc-
tion industries in the South has been the
fast-growing tourism and gaming indus-
tries, especially in Louisiana and Missis-
sippi. While the casino boom remains
alive in Mississippi, it has tapered off in
Louisiana and may provide less stimulus
to the region in coming years.
From 1990 through 1995, growth in
the South’s service and construction
sectors was accompanied by job gains
in the manufacturing sector. During the
early 1990s, manufacturing lost 605,330
jobs nationally, while each of the south-
ern states recorded job gains in that 
sector. In Arkansas and Mississippi,
manufacturing accounts for more than
20 percent of total employment, a larger
share than in Texas, New Mexico,
Louisiana and Oklahoma, where manu-
facturing’s share is less than the 15-
percent national average. Arkansas’ and
Mississippi’s manufacturing sectors have
expanded in the 1990s, partly due to
strong growth in industrial machinery
manufacturing in Mississippi and trans-
portation equipment manufacturing in
Arkansas.
3 Texas and New Mexico have
benefited from the expansion of high-
tech manufacturing, such as semicon-
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Table 1
1990–95 Annualized Nonfarm Job Growth
(Percent)
Total nonfarm Service-
employment producing Manufacturing Construction Mining
Texas 2.49 2.87 .66 4.03 –2.92
New Mexico 3.53 3.49 .95 9.42 –.6
Louisiana 2.20 2.65 .41 2.75 –3.78
Oklahoma 1.91 2.43 .14 3.97 –5.77
Arkansas 2.96 3.27 2.15 3.37 –3.78
Mississippi 2.81 3.48 .92 4.24 –4.26
United States 1.40 1.94 –.63 .32 –3.93
SOURCES: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas; Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Arkansas
Despite current strength, Arkansas will
settle into lower growth for the next year
and a half as national demand factors
weaken and limited inflationary pressure
becomes evident.…Arkansas will tech-
nically extend its streak of employment
growth above the nation, but absolute
growth will be low compared to recent
years.…Growth in retail sales and gross
state product will decelerate through
mid-1997 and make a moderate recov-
ery in 1998.…Manufacturing industries
in Arkansas will be held back by gener-
ally weaker domestic markets in con-
struction and automotive sectors.
—University of Arkansas 
at Little Rock, Institute for 
Economic Advancement (1996)
Mississippi
Mississippi’s economy is keeping pace
with the rest of the South, which again is
outperforming the nation as a whole.…
Both output and employment in 1996 are
expected to grow at rates comparable 
to those of last year.…Overall employ-
ment growth is projected at 0.9 percent
in 1996 and 1.2 percent in 1997.…A
continuing rise in unemployment is likely
over the next few years as the current
period of economic expansion draws to
a close.…[T]he increase in personal in-
come will be solid, at close to 5.0 per-
cent for (1996 and 1997).…The service
sector will continue to lead employment
growth…and will be the single largest
source of new jobs. Employment in
wholesale trade and retail trade, which,
along with services, has accounted for
most of the jobs created in the past
decade, is the only sector apart from
services which will enjoy a growth rate of
over 2 percent in employment.
—Mississippi Institutions of 
Higher Learning, Center for Policy
Research and Planning (1996)
Table 2
Wages, Salaries and Income
1995 per capita Annualized income
1995 average wage personal income growth, 1990–95
in manufacturing (Estimates) (Percent)
Texas $11.60 $20,654 5.4
New Mexico 10.75 18,055 6.2
Louisiana 13.57 18,827 7.2
Oklahoma 11.55 18,152 4.7
Arkansas 10.23 17,429 6.0
Mississippi 9.90 16,531 7.1
United States 12.48 22,788 5.1
SOURCES: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; John Sharp, Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts;
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.burdens. As Table 3 shows, with the ex-
ception of New Mexico, the southern
states rank in the bottom half of the 50
states in estimated tax burden.
5 The dis-
tribution of the tax burden, however, is
not shared equally among all goods,
services and factors of production. The
weight of taxes in the South tends to fall
more heavily on consumption of goods
and services through relatively high
sales tax burdens. Because Texas has
no state income tax, it must generate
revenue through other forms of taxa-
tion, particularly property taxes. On the
other hand, New Mexico imposes a
very low property tax liability, but the
state ranks high in terms of total tax
burden because it has one of the na-
tion’s largest sales tax burdens.
Demographics. Another distin-
guishing feature of the South is its
younger and faster growing population.
Overall population growth averaged 1.5
percent in the South during the first half
of the 1990s, compared with 1 percent
for the nation. In particular, Texas’ and
New Mexico’s populations grew at least
twice as fast as the national average in
the 1990s. Growth rates were less
marked in the other southern states, but
as the overall U.S. population ages,
growth rates may pick up in states that
attract retirees, such as Arkansas. Strong
population growth in the region is a re-
sult of both high rates of domestic and
international migration and generally
higher than average birth rates.
ductor, computer and telecommunications
equipment manufacturing, and strong
demand for new homes and buildings
has boosted construction-related in-
dustries in Oklahoma’s manufacturing
sector. Overall, the relative vitality of
the South’s manufacturing sector can 
be attributed to several factors that
make the business climate in the South
a favorable one.
The South: A Good Place for Business
A favorable climate, in terms of busi-
ness as well as the weather, makes the
South an attractive place to live and
conduct commerce. Several characteris-
tics of the region provide its economic
environment with a comparative ad-
vantage over much of the rest of the 
nation. Texas, New Mexico, Louisiana,
Arkansas, Oklahoma and Mississippi
enjoy cheaper labor, less expensive real
estate and a lighter tax burden than
their counterparts in the Northeast and
on the West Coast.
Labor. Perhaps the biggest business
advantage the South offers is cheaper
labor. Average hourly manufacturing
wages are below the national average
in all states except Louisiana (Table 2).
4
Louisiana’s average wage numbers are
higher because a large share of Loui-
siana’s manufacturing jobs are in the
high-paying chemical industry. On a
less positive note, while relatively
cheaper labor is good for business, it
translates into lower per capita income.
Nevertheless, the region’s recent eco-
nomic prosperity has meant that, in
most cases, incomes have been increas-
ing faster than the national average in
the 1990s.
Real Estate. Real estate prices are
also lower in these six states, making
this region attractive to relocating firms
and their employees. In the South,
home prices and office rents plum-
meted after the 1986 bust and have only
begun to recover in recent years. Some
of the cost differential between the
South and other areas has eroded as
firm relocations and expansions have
helped the region’s real estate markets
recover, but the South remains a bar-
gain. For example, office rents average
about $18 per square foot in Albu-
querque and Las Colinas, near Dallas.
This figure compares with rates of $32
per square foot in New York and $25
per square foot in San Francisco. In 
addition, Chart 6 shows that while
home prices are rising in some southern
cities, for the most part they remain
lower than the national average, with
one exception being fast-growing 
Albuquerque.
Tax Burden. In addition to lower
labor and real estate costs, most south-
ern states have relatively low total tax
“A favorable climate…makes the South an attractive place 
to live and conduct commerce.”
Table 3
State Rankings for Per Capita Tax Revenue
As a Percentage of Personal Income in 1992
Total state and local
tax revenue Property tax Income tax Sales tax
Texas 34 14 None 9
New Mexico 10 49 36 3
Louisiana 28 45 39 4
Oklahoma 36 48 25 14
Arkansas 42 46 26 8
Mississippi 45 37 40 10
SOURCE: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1994).
Chart 6
Median Sales Price 
Of Existing Homes
Thousands of dollars



















Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Page  5The southern region’s population is
also younger than the national average.
For example, Texas’ population is the
third youngest in the nation, behind
Utah and Alaska. In 1994, the median
age was 31.9 years in Texas and 32.4 
in New Mexico, Louisiana and Missis-
sippi. In comparison, the national 
median age was 34.
A faster growing and younger popu-
lation should benefit the South in sev-
eral ways. First, a faster growing
population is likely to boost the con-
struction sector as more homes and
apartments are needed in the South 
relative to other areas. Second, the
South’s fast-growing population should
attract retailers and other consumer-
oriented businesses. Finally, labor force
growth is likely to be faster in the South
than at the national level, which may be
important as the aging of the baby
boomers causes U.S. labor force growth
to cool. This could be a positive factor
for businesses in southern areas with
tight labor markets, as entry-level posi-
tions will be less difficult to fill.
6
A Challenge: Education. Youth and
diversity have brought a special chal-
lenge to the South. In most of the re-
gion, the percentage of the popula-
tion that is high school and college
graduates remains below the national
average.
7 Rapid improvement in these
figures seems unlikely, given that high
school dropout rates in Texas, Louisiana
and Mississippi are above the national
average.
As the South’s population increases,
it is also expected to become more eth-
nically diverse. In fact, minorities are
likely to represent the largest segment
of new entrants into the labor force in
the coming years. Because the high
school dropout rate is higher for 
minorities, they may be less likely to
obtain the education necessary for high-
skill, high-wage positions. A challenge
for the southern states is to train, edu-
cate and successfully assimilate these
young Southerners into an increasingly
diverse labor force.
would make the South unpopular among workers were it not for the
fact that the cost of living in the South tends to be lower than the na-
tional average as well.
5 Tax burden here is defined as the amount of total state–local 
revenues as a percentage of state personal income. For other 
measures of state tax burden, see Tannenwald (1996).
6 See Petersen (1996).
7 Although Texas has a relatively high percentage of college graduates,
this can be attributed to the migration of highly educated workers to
the state rather than a superior education system within the state.
(The high school dropout rate is a better indicator of the quality of the
state’s current system.)
8 See DRI/McGraw-Hill (1996).
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Conclusion
The South has staged quite a come-
back from the difficult economic times
of the late 1980s. In addition to a mild
climate and central location, several
unique factors have attracted people
and businesses to the southern states.
These factors—which include low labor
and real estate costs, relatively favor-
able tax treatment and a relatively young
population—should help keep the
South’s expansion alive in coming years.
Because the South has diversified
away from resource-based industries 
toward service-based industries, the
southern states’ economies are more
like the nation’s and are therefore gov-
erned in large part by national trends.
The national economy is expected to
slow in the next few years as the recent
expansion matures, and the economies
of the southern states are expected to
slow as well.
8 Based on the forecast 
of a softening in national growth, the
coming years in the South are expected
to be somewhat less robust than the
first half of the decade. Still, barring any
purely regional shocks, the South’s
economy should continue to perform
somewhat better than the national
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1 For a more thorough discussion of the oil industry’s recent consoli-
dation, see Gilmer (1996).
2 For an explanation of how different states respond to an increase in
oil prices, see Brown and Yücel (1995).
3 In 1996, the manufacturing sectors in these two states have weak-
ened, but growth was quite healthy over the 1990–95 period.
4 These wages are nominal—that is, not adjusted for the price level.
The lower nominal wages that make the South attractive to business
sORKERS FEAR IT. Firms pon-
der its benefits. Financial
markets celebrate it. Some
politicians want government
to shield us from it. Media
portray it as the scourge of
the 1990s. Downsizing.
Even in an economic recovery mov-
ing through its sixth year, Americans
can’t escape the reality that some work-
ers are still losing their jobs. The num-
bers making the headlines are often big
enough to provoke anxiety: 74,000 jobs
cut at General Motors, 60,000 at IBM,
50,000 at Sears, 40,000 at AT&T.
1 In the
1990s, hundreds of other companies
have announced layoffs large enough to
command at least a few inches in the
New York Times, and many more jobs
have vanished without fanfare. A recent
U.S. Department of Labor survey found
that companies dismissed 17.4 million
workers from 1990 to 1995.
2
Our instinct is to interpret job losses
as a sign of failure—something wrong
with the system or something wrong
with us. To some people, downsizing
signifies a breakdown in the loyalty 
that once held company and worker 
together. To others, it signifies personal
defeat, a verdict that we, as workers, are
no longer valuable human resources.
Viewing layoffs as a malfunction, some
of capitalism’s critics go so far as pro-
posing that government reward “good”
companies that don’t cut jobs and pun-
ish “bad” ones that do with taxes, sanc-
tions and regulations.
Such views are incomplete, if not
wholly incorrect and dangerous. Layoffs
aren’t a sign of failure, not for the 
economy, not even for most workers.
Job losses hurt American workers and
their families, no doubt about that, 
but downsizing cannot be understood 
apart from a broader view of the econ-
omy’s health and well-being. More
often than not, labor force turnover 
reflects positive market forces at work.
Companies develop new or cheaper
products, entrepreneurs pursue oppor-
tunities, factories and offices become
more productive. In the process, new
jobs inevitably replace old ones. This 
is how the economy grows: through a
relentless process of turmoil, a con-
tinuous “churn,” what economist 
Joseph Schumpeter called creative de-
struction. One of the great ironies of 
a free enterprise system is that the 
bad news of job losses is part and 
parcel of the good news of rising living
standards.
Downsizing in Microcosm:
Smaller but More Productive
A microcosm of recent downsizing
will help illustrate what’s happening 
behind the handwringing and head-
lines. Table 1 presents a sample of 10
large U.S. companies that shed labor in
the 1990s, each mentioned time and
again in accounts of America’s layoffs.
3
All told, they jettisoned almost 850,000
workers between 1990 and 1995. Every
one of these companies employs fewer
workers today than five years ago, so
the layoffs appear to be permanent.
These companies, and others like them,
are the ones critics of downsizing wag
their disapproving fingers at and scold
as hard-hearted and uncaring.
Beyond the lost jobs, however, an-
other set of facts, typically overlooked,
W
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Table 1
Less Equals More
Downsizing and Productivity Among the Top 10 Corporate Job Cutters
Productivity
1990 1995 gain or loss (–),
Stock Stock 1990–95
Company Sales* Employees price Sales* Employees price Jobs cut (Percent)
Sears $ 65,263 460,000 $ 253/8 $ 35,181 275,000 $ 39 185,000 –10.3%
IBM 80,475 373,816 113 71,940 252,215 913/8 121,601 28.1
K-mart 37,405 370,000 141/4 34,654 250,000 71/8 120,000 31.6
General Electric 68,111 298,000 283/4 70,028 222,000 72 76,000 32.2
General Dynamics 11,872 98,100 125/8 3,544 27,700 591/8 70,400 5.6
Digital Equipment 15,257  124,000 547/8 13,813 61,700 641/8 62,300 59.9
McDonnell Douglas 19,065 121,190 61/2 14,332 63,612 46 57,578 35.9
Boeing 32,176 161,700 453/8 19,515 105,000 783/8 56,700 –6.8
General Motors 146,936  761,400 343/8 168,829 709,000 527/8 52,400 21.0
GTE 21,424 154,000 291/4 19,957 106,000 437/8 48,000 30.3
Total $497,984 2,922,206 100** $451,792 2,072,227 $2303/4** 849,979 24.7
NOTES: * Figures are in millions of 1995 dollars.
** Equally weighted index; calculated as                        , where P signifies a stock price, i signifies a company and t first equals year-end 1990, then 1995.















= ådeserves equal attention. After adjust-
ing for inflation, the collective output 
of all 10 firms was down 9.7 percent.
The companies used 34.4 percent fewer
workers, however, so output per worker
surged nearly 25 percent, or 5 percent 
a year. Their performance greatly ex-
ceeded the economy’s average annual
productivity gain of roughly 1.5 per-
cent.
4 Rising productivity plays a vital
role in rising living standards, so it’s in-
congruous to celebrate productivity
gains yet denigrate downsizing.
That’s not all. With the exceptions of
Sears and Boeing, the companies in
Table 1 emerged from downsizing 
more competitive, and thus more likely
to survive. Those who want to identify
“good” firms and “bad” firms should
take note: if firms don’t survive, nobody
has a job.
More often than not, the wisdom in
the hard-nosed decision to downsize
wins approval on Wall Street as compa-
nies become more profitable and stock
prices rise. Indeed, stock price gains
among the companies listed in Table 1
averaged over 130 percent from 1990 
to 1995, as compared with only 86 per-
cent for the S&P 500 companies over-
all.
5 That’s half again as much, a gain
that surely pensioners and other in-
vestors would celebrate.
And what about the 850,000 employ-
ees cut by the 10 companies shown in
Table 1? In such a complex economy, 
of course, there’s no way of tracking
what happened to each individual
worker, but the vast majority most likely
found jobs elsewhere. Clearly, this isn’t
a heroic assumption: today’s unemploy-
ment rate of 5.2 percent is below that of
1990, and the economy has added
nearly 11 million new jobs, net of those
destroyed, in the past five years. Op-
portunities are out there, and many dis-
placed workers are moving to new jobs
in sectors that need labor to expand.
As displaced workers take new jobs,
they add to U.S. economic output. A
precise calculation of their contribution
isn’t possible, but a reasonable estimate
might come from the average output of
an American worker—roughly $58,000
a year. The 850,000 workers recycled
from downsizing just 10 firms could in-
crease the country’s GDP by $49 billion,
not a bad bonus hidden in the usually
glum assessments of layoffs.
Downsizing in Macrocosm:
Problem or Progress?
“Downsizing” may well be the new
buzzword for layoffs. But it’s something
that’s been going on for centuries. 
In 1800, for example, it took nearly 95
of every 100 Americans to feed the
country. In 1900, it required 40. Today,
it takes just three. The downsizing of
Page  8 Southwest Economy   November/December 1996 
Table 2
Dialing for Dollars Pennies
Downsizing and Productivity in Long-Distance Communications
1970 1994 No progress*
Long distance calls 9.9 billion 83.4 billion 83.4 billion
Switchboard operators 421,000 176,000 3,564,607
Calls per operator per day 64 1,300 64
Operators as a share .51% .14% 2.85%
of the labor force
Work time required to buy a 40.3 minutes 7.0 minutes 40.3 minutes
five-minute, coast-to-coast call
* 1994’s volume of calls at 1970’s level of productivity.
SOURCES: Federal Communications Commission (1994–95); U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (1996a).
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Man acquires wealth in 
proportion as he puts his
labor to better account.
—Frederic Bastiat
The creation of new capital
always…releases…labor. 
Its actual effect [though] 
is not to make jobs scarce, 
but to free men’s labor 
for other jobs.
—Frederic Bastiatagriculture, however, hasn’t left the
country hungry. Quite the contrary, the
United States enjoys agricultural abun-
dance—and much more. The workers
no longer needed on the farm are avail-
able to provide new homes, computers,
pharmaceuticals, appliances, medical
assistance, movies, financial advice,
video games, gourmet meals, and an 
almost dizzying array of other goods
and services. The country today would
have much less if farming had not en-
dured one of history’s most drastic
downsizings.
Most of the exodus from farming 
occurred generations ago, so today’s
Americans have scant memory of the
dislocations it caused. What we have in-
stead is the abundance that comes from
allowing the churn to deliver the
bounty of higher productivity, wherever
and whenever it might occur.
Telephone service provides another
rich example of how the economy as a
whole benefits as some workers lose
their jobs (Table 2). In 1970, the in-
dustry employed 421,000 switchboard
operators, and Americans made 9.9 
billion long distance calls. By 1994,
Americans rang up 83.4 billion long 
distance calls. Yet new switching tech-
nology allowed telephone companies
to downsize this segment of their busi-
ness to 176,000 operators.
6
The telecommunications industry
could do more with less because a
surge in productivity was under way. 
In 1970, the industry handled only 64
calls a day for every operator. By 1994,
the figure had jumped to 1,300—a 
staggering gain. Without the boost in 
efficiency, today’s volume of long dis-
tance traffic would require 3.6 million
operators, or 2.9 percent of our labor
force, instead of the 0.14 percent it 
actually takes.
7 Americans would be
worse off in two ways: we would lose
the goods and services 3.4 million
workers now produce elsewhere in the
economy. And we would pay six times
as much for our long distance tele-
phone calls.
8
Viewed in macrocosm and with the
benefit of hindsight, it is easier to see
that downsizing is simply conserva-
tion—recycling of the economy’s valu-
able labor resources.
Rightsizing for the ’90s
Shedding labor allows companies to
adapt to changes in the marketplace.
More often than not, downsizing is a
matter of sheer survival. Companies
with surplus labor will usually have
higher production costs and risk losing
business to “lean and mean” competi-
tors that can lure away customers with
lower prices. Market discipline—in effect,
consumers’ scrutiny—pushes relentlessly
at companies, forcing them to econo-
mize on resources, including labor.
Each company must determine its
own “right” number of employees, but
there’s evidence that average firm size
has been shrinking in most industries.
In effect, the whole economy has been
downsizing.
From the early 1960s through the
’70s and until 1980, the average size of
a company grew—from 13.0 employees
in 1962, to 16.3 in 1970 and 16.5 in 1980.
At the peak in 1970, roughly 37 percent
of Americans worked in firms of 250 or
more employees (Chart 1). In that era,
bigger was better. In the past decade 
or so, however, the trend has gone 
the other way. The average number of
employees per firm slipped to 14.8 in 
1993, with only 29 percent of workers
employed by firms of 250 or more.
9
Downsizing has suited a broad spec-
trum of industrial categories—manufac-
turing; mining; construction; agriculture;
wholesale trade; finance, insurance and
real estate (FIRE); and transportation,
communication and public utilities
(TCPU) (Chart 2). Average firm size has
continued to grow in only two broad
sectors. Retail trade went from 12.3
workers in 1980 to 12.7 in 1993. Com-
panies in the catchall category called
“other services,” which includes health
care, entertainment and information in-
dustries, expanded from 11.3 to 14.1
employees, on average.
Why are companies getting smaller?
One factor might be the computer, an
innovation that’s touched many indus-
tries.
10 These tools, hard to find inside
any firm two decades ago, are now 
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Small Is In














    







SOURCE: Bureau of the Census, County Business Patterns, various issues.almost ubiquitous. In fact, half of 
American workers now use computers
on the job. Becoming less expensive
and more powerful as they’ve spread
through the economy, computers allow
people to work easier and faster than
ever before. With a computer, a secre-
tary can quickly revise and print the
boss’ correspondence (or workers can
do their own), reducing the work for a
typing pool. Using hand-held devices,
salespeople can submit orders with a
keystroke or two, cutting the need for
personnel to process paperwork. In
steel mills, automobile plants and other
factories, computers control the produc-
tion process, so one technician can now
do what once took dozens of workers.
And with the advent of the Internet, in-
dividual workers are becoming more
able every day to locate and download
information that once might have taken
a small staff.
The computer might also help ex-
plain why retail trade and many other
services aren’t showing a decline in 
average firm size. More than mining or
manufacturing, these businesses rely on
one-on-one contact with customers, a
task ill-suited to the computer. As a re-
sult, firms in these sectors don’t get 
the same benefits from trimming em-
ployment.
A Lesson from the EC
No one can guarantee that every dis-
placed worker will readily find a good-
paying job, but unemployment in the
United States is, for most workers, rela-
tively brief. Job openings average
roughly 525,000 per month, more than
double the typical monthly growth of
the labor force.
11 Half of those who lose
their jobs find another within six to
eight weeks; two-thirds find one within
14 weeks; and seven-eighths within six
months. Recent studies show that most
workers replace their old job with a
new one that pays as well or better.
12
Even if unemployment is brief, it is
unsettling, and society will always be
tempted to look for ways to avoid lay-
offs. Job-saving policies, however,
aren’t the way to make Americans bet-
ter off. An economy will remain vibrant
and forward-moving only if it can re-
distribute its labor resources in re-
sponse to changes in demand and
advances in technology. Efforts to pro-
tect jobs by short-circuiting the churn
invariably produce higher unemploy-
ment, slower job growth and lower pro-
ductivity growth in the long run.
A comparison between the United
States and the European Community
bears this out. While America’s labor
market remains relatively unencum-
bered, many EC nations, hoping to
thwart job losses, have saddled employ-
ers with burdensome rules on when
and how workers can be dismissed.
The red tape and reproach involved in
cutting jobs makes firms wary of hiring
new workers in the first place. With few
new opportunities opening up, workers
cling to existing jobs. As a result, too
many of Europe’s labor resources re-
main frozen, and companies cannot re-
spond quickly and aggressively to
changes in the market.
The EC may have managed to “save”
a few existing jobs, but at a high cost 
in economic performance. Growth is
slower. Productivity gains are meager.
13
Most telling, the effort to preserve jobs
has largely hindered prospects for
workers. The United States has added
11 million jobs since 1990, a gain of 
9 percent, while the EC has created 5
million, or just 3 percent. For most of
this decade, unemployment in the EC
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THEUPSIDEOFDOWNSIZINGhas been at 10 percent or more, almost
double the U.S. rate. Worse yet, over 5
percent of the EC’s labor force has been
out of work for a year or more. In the
United States, the figure is less than
three-fourths of 1 percent.
Enduring the Churn:
America’s Real Source of Strength
Some may say that downsizing has
“gone too far.”
14 There’s no denying the
upheaval caused by letting economic
forces work. Yet we cannot ignore 
the much greater cost that would be 
imposed by forcing companies to main-
tain the status quo. To society, the valu-
able resource clearly is the worker, not
an existing job. Efforts to preserve jobs
may well succeed, but these policies
will rob the economy of its vitality 
and deprive this generation and future
ones of the progress that lifts living
standards. Indeed, what makes the
American economy so strong is our
willingness to endure the churn and let
it enrich our economy over and over
again.
— W. Michael Cox
Richard Alm
Notes
1 These numbers refer to layoff announcements, not to the total jobs
these companies cut from 1990 to 1995, which have been much
greater.
2 Data are from the U.S. Department of Labor (1996b).
3 By and large, the companies reviewed here reduced their labor force
through layoffs rather than divestitures, although this distinction 
is not a critical one. Restructuring by any means—downsizing, 
divestiture, merger, acquisition, leveraged buyout and so forth—will
typically have both employment and output effects for the firm, and
thus can be investigated in terms of its effect on productivity.
4 Productivity in this study is calculated as output per worker, rather
than output per hour, as typically measured.
5 Moreover, at 3.13 percent, the dividend yield for the 10 stocks listed
in Table 1 averaged more than that (2.88 percent) for the S&P 500
companies over the 1990–95 period. Reinvesting all dividends, a
$100 investment at year-end 1990, spread equally across each of the
10 firms listed in Table 1, would have grown to $269.16 (an average
annual rate of 21.9 percent), as compared with only $214.95 (16.5
percent annually) for an S&P 500 investment.
6 At the same time jobs have been pared from this segment of the
telecommunications industry, they have been added to others. Em-
ployment in the cellular telecommunications segment, for example,
increased from 15,927 at the beginning of 1990 to 68,165 by the end
of 1995, for a net gain of 52,238 jobs in six years.
7 Hourly wages of telephone operators also grew at a pace one-third to
one-half better than average during the 1990s. From 1990 to 1995,
operators’ hourly wages increased at an average rate of 4.04 percent
annually, as compared with only 2.66 percent for all other clerical
workers and 2.91 percent for hourly employees as a whole.
8 Figures are based on the amount of work time required for a typical
manufacturing employee to afford a five-minute daytime residential
call from New York to Los Angeles, calculated as the price of the 
call divided by average hourly manufacturing wages. For 1970, this
calculation is ($2.25/$3.35) = 0.67 hours = 40.3 minutes, and for
1994 the figure is ($1.40/$12.06) = 7.0 minutes. Based on AT&T’s
new One Rate Plan (15 cents anytime, anywhere), the 1996 work time
figure is 31/2 minutes.
9 Data are the most recent available.
10 One other important factor is the increasing tendency for firms to
outsource many of their functions (such as payroll and accounting)
to smaller firms that can do them more efficiently.
11 Job openings data are monthly averages for 1993–95 and are the
most recent available.
12 See Council of Economic Advisers (1996).
13 GDP and productivity (output per worker) growth averaged 1.5 per-
cent and –0.1 percent in Europe over the 1990–95 period, while in
the United States, growth averaged 2.5 and 1.5 percent, respectively.
14 See Reich (1996).
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There is not a tool, an implement or a machine that has not
resulted in a decrease in the contribution of human labor.
Labor is not made permanently idle [though]; when replaced 
in one special category…it turns its attack against other 
obstacles on the main road to progress.
—Frederic Bastiat
sHE 20-PERCENT increase in the
federal minimum wage sched-
uled to occur over the next year
may not be the best way to
boost the incomes of low-
skilled workers and their fami-
lies. This article explores the purpose
and impact of the minimum wage in 
an effort to discover whether it is a
good idea.
Proponents of the minimum wage
argue that it ensures a “living wage” for
workers who might otherwise be un-
derpaid, while opponents claim it costs
hundreds of thousands of workers their
jobs and reduces new hires of unskilled
workers. About 10 percent of workers
will be directly affected by the two in-
creases in the minimum wage Congress
authorized in 1996. The first increase,
which took effect on October 1,
boosted the minimum wage from $4.25
to $4.75. The second increase, sched-
uled for September 1, 1997, will raise
the wage floor to $5.15.
A Brief History
A public outcry over wages and
working conditions in turn-of-the-
century sweatshops led to the first 
minimum wages in the United States.
Several states, beginning with Massa-
chusetts in 1912, regulated minimum
wages, maximum hours and working
conditions for women and minors. A
national minimum wage was created 
in 1938 when President Franklin D.
Roosevelt signed the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act (FLSA). Initially set at 25 cents
per hour, the wage floor applied to in-
dustries engaged in interstate commerce
and covered about one-fifth of the labor
force. The FLSA also required overtime
pay and set restrictions on child labor.
The basic goal of the minimum wage
is to guarantee workers a “fair wage.”
Congress determines increases in the
federal minimum wage and has usually
set it at about one-half the average 
manufacturing wage. (Table 1 summa-
rizes the history of the federal minimum
wage.) Since the minimum wage is set
in nominal terms, its real value declines
as prices rise until Congress raises the
wage floor again, creating the sawtooth
pattern evident in Chart 1. As shown in
the chart, the minimum wage fell dra-
matically relative to the average manu-
facturing wage during the 1980s,
prompting one-third of the states to im-
pose state minimum wages above the
federal level. Over time, Congress has
greatly expanded the coverage of the
FLSA, and almost 90 percent of workers
now must be paid at least the minimum
wage. Most businesses with annual
sales of less than $500,000 are exempt
from the minimum wage standard.
Concerns that the wage floor would
reduce employment for certain groups
of workers led to the creation of “sub-
minimum wages.” The federal wage
floor has usually been lower for stu-
dents, and in 1989, the subminimum
wage was expanded to cover all
teenagers. Under the 1996 law, employ-
ers will still be able to pay teenagers
$4.25 for up to 90 days. Tipped em-
ployees may also be paid less than the
wage floor since the law currently in-
cludes a “tip credit” that allows employ-
ers to pay workers $2.13 an hour and
credit tips for the rest of the wage floor.
Who Earns the Minimum Wage?
Before we assess the effects of mini-
mum wage hikes, it is useful to exam-
ine the demographics of those earning
the minimum wage to determine whether
the policy helps low-skilled workers
who support families or merely boosts
the incomes of middle-class teenagers.
Relatively few workers earn exactly the
minimum wage—only 5.3 percent in
1995. Fewer than 10 percent of workers
earned between $4.25 and $5.15.
There are two main types of mini-
mum wage workers: youths who are
earning a starting wage, often while still
in school, and adult women for whom
the minimum wage is a primary source
of household income. In 1995, more
than one-third of all workers earning
the federal minimum wage were teen-
agers, and another one-fifth were aged
20–24. The vast majority were part-time
REEXAMININGTHEMINIMUMWAGE





Date of Date of Nominal
legislation increase minimum wage
1938 October 1938 $ .25
October 1939 .30
October 1945 .40
1949 January 1950 .75
1955 March 1956 1.00
1961 September 1961 1.15
September 1963 1.25
1966 February 1967 1.40
February 1968 1.60
1974 May 1974 2.00
January 1975 2.10
January 1976 2.30




1989 April 1990 3.80
April 1991 4.25
1996 October 1996 4.75
September 1997 5.15
NOTES: Nominal minimum wage is the highest minimum
wage in effect; lower rates often are applied 
to workers newly covered by the Fair Labor
Standards Act or to young workers.
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical
Abstract, various years.
“A public outcry over wages…in turn-of-the-century sweatshops 
led to the first minimum wages in the United States.”workers, and over 60 percent of work-
ers paid the federal minimum wage were
female. Table 2 summarizes the charac-
teristics of minimum wage workers.
Minimum wage workers are highly
concentrated in the retail trade and ser-
vice sectors and in small businesses.
Over four-fifths of workers paid the 
federal minimum wage in 1993 were
employed by retail trade or service 
establishments. More than one-half of
all workers earning the minimum wage
were employed at establishments with
fewer than 25 employees, and about 
85 percent were employed by estab-
lishments with fewer than 100 employ-
ees. In addition, a higher fraction of
workers employed by small businesses
are paid the minimum wage; almost 4
percent of employees at establishments
with fewer than 25 employees earned
the minimum wage, compared with less
than 1 percent at establishments with
more than 250 employees.
Many economists believe that the
minimum wage raises the wages of
middle-class teens while doing little to
help the working poor get out of
poverty. Edward Gramlich (1976) found
that any income gains among teenagers
resulting from the minimum wage are
about evenly split between high-income
and low-income families. The vast ma-
jority of minimum wage workers are
not the primary wage earner in a poor
family; Richard Burkhauser and T.
Aldrich Finegan (1989) estimated that in
the mid-1980s only 7 percent of low-
wage workers were heads of families
living in poverty. Burkhauser, Kenneth
Couch and David Wittenberg (1996)
found that almost 40 percent of all
workers directly affected by the mini-
mum wage increases in 1990 and 1991
were from families in the top half of the
income distribution, with 4 percent of
affected workers in the top decile.
The minimum wage does have the
potential to raise the incomes of some
poor households, particularly those
headed by women. About 40 percent 
of poor adults worked in 1994, and
low-wage workers contribute about
one-half of household earnings. Over
one-fourth of all workers in the lowest
family income decile were affected by
the 1990 and 1991 federal minimum
wage increases, according to Burk-
hauser, Couch and Wittenberg. Because
women tend to have lower earnings
than men, working women are more
likely to be in poverty. In 1987, the
earnings of nearly 18 percent of work-
ing female household heads were less
than the poverty level.
However, the minimum wage is not
high enough to lift most single-earner
families out of poverty. After the fed-
eral minimum reaches $5.15 in 1997, a
full-time, year-round worker will earn
about $10,700 annually before taxes,
less than the poverty level for a family
with two children. More than one-half
of all families headed by single women
with children were below the poverty
level in 1993.
In addition, low-skilled adults may
be the most likely to be laid off when
the minimum wage is raised. Minimum
wage increases may draw more-skilled
workers into the labor market and
cause employers to switch from low-
skilled workers to high-skilled ones. 
Indeed, Kevin Lang (1994) found that
minimum wage increases appear to
have caused restaurants to substitute
teenagers for lower skilled adult work-
ers. Similarly, research by David Neumark
and William Wascher (1995) suggests
that employers substitute higher skilled
teens for lower skilled teens when the
minimum wage is raised.
Youths who earn the minimum wage
are soon likely to earn higher wages,
while adults with low levels of educa-
tion are more likely to get stuck at the
wage floor. Ralph Smith and Bruce
Vavrichek (1992) followed a group of
workers earning the minimum wage in
the mid-1980s and found that over 60
percent of them were earning higher
wages after one year, with a median
wage gain of 20 percent. However, over
one-third of those workers who were
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Table 2
Characteristics of Minimum
Wage Workers in 1993







In retail trade or services 83
Employed by small businesses*** 60
NOTES: * Defined as workers paid an hourly wage of
$4.25, the federal minimum wage. All figures
based on the 1993 Current Population
Survey. Establishment data are from D. Card
and A. Krueger (1995).
** Usual weekly hours less than 35.
*** Establishments with fewer than 25 workers.
Chart 1
Minimum Wage and Manufacturing Wage
Real minimum wage Real manufacturing wage





















Manufacturing wagestill employed a year later did not 
experience any wage increase, even 
before adjusting for inflation. These
workers tended to be older and have
less education than workers who expe-
rienced a wage increase. These demo-
graphics suggest that a substantial
minority of low-wage workers might 
receive even lower wages in the ab-
sence of a minimum wage.
Teens and low-skilled women are
the primary earners of the minimum
wage. If the minimum wage is designed
to ensure a “living wage” for families, it
fails to accomplish this because it does
not raise a single-earner household with
children out of poverty. Although the
minimum wage raises some workers’
wages, it also may hurt the very workers
it is designed to help since businesses
may respond to minimum wage increases
by reducing the number of employees,
cutting the number of hours worked by
employees and/or raising prices.
Effects of Minimum Wage Increases
Neoclassical economic theory pre-
dicts that a minimum wage increase will
reduce the number of low-wage work-
ers demanded by employers. Under this
model, employment of workers who
initially earned less than the new wage
floor should fall when the minimum
wage is increased. If employers need to
raise the wages of other workers to
maintain a wage hierarchy within the
firm, the ripple effect can cause even
greater employment losses.
Economists have tested this theory
by examining the effect of minimum
wage increases on employment among
teenagers. Most studies have found that
an increase in the minimum wage
slightly lowers teenage employment.
1 In
their 1982 survey of minimum wage 
research, Charles Brown, Curtis Gilroy
and Andrew Kohen conclude that a 10-
percent increase in the minimum wage
reduces teen employment by 1 to 3 per-
cent. In a recent study, Donald Deere,
Kevin M. Murphy and Finis Welch
(1995) conclude that the 1990 and 1991
increases in the federal minimum wage
caused teen employment to be at least
10 percent lower than it would other-
wise have been.
Several recent studies, however, have
found that minimum wage increases 
appear not to reduce employment
among low-wage workers. David Card
and Alan Krueger (1995) find that in-
creases in federal and state minimum
wages during the 1980s and early 1990s
did not reduce employment among
teenagers or workers at fast-food res-
taurants. Indeed, their research suggests
that the increases may even have
slightly raised employment. In a partic-
ularly controversial study, Card and
Krueger find that a 90-cent increase in
New Jersey’s minimum wage in 1992
appears to have increased employment
at fast-food restaurants relative to 
neighboring Pennsylvania, which did
not experience a minimum wage in-
crease. This research, and its implica-
tions for public policy, has been
strongly criticized on methodological
and theoretical grounds.
There are several potential reasons
employment might not fall when the
minimum wage rises. First, an increase
in the minimum wage simply might not
be large enough to raise wages. Even if
the minimum wage hike raises workers’
pay, there are several possible scenarios
in which employment might not fall or
might even increase. One such possi-
bility is monopsony, in which a firm 
can attract more workers if it increases
the wage. If workers with similar skills
have different reservation wages—the
lowest wage at which they are willing
to work—then an employer will first
hire those workers with the lowest
reservation wages. As a firm hires more
workers, it must raise the wage, but em-
ployers may not be willing to pay
higher wages to all workers to attract
additional workers. Under this theory, 
a minimum wage increase forces the
employer to offer a higher wage and 
increases the number of persons willing
to work, thereby possibly increasing
employment.
2 Another possibility is that
existing workers become more pro-
ductive when the minimum wage is
raised or higher skilled workers enter
the labor market, and increased output
balances out the higher cost of labor 
to employers.
These explanations for why minimum
wage increases may not reduce em-
ployment are not particularly compel-
ling or realistic. Monopsony power
effectively requires that an individual
firm have a monopoly on jobs. This 
almost certainly does not characterize
the labor market for most firms, partic-
ularly those that employ low-skill, low-
wage labor—just consider the number
of fast-food restaurants in your town
and think about whether any one of
those firms can be considered a mo-
nopoly provider of jobs for low-skill
workers. In addition, if a firm can in-
crease output and potentially earn
greater profits by offering a higher
wage, it should be willing to offer the
higher wage without the mandate of the
minimum wage.
Another reason employment might
not fall when the minimum wage in-
creases is that businesses may reduce
hours while keeping the same number
of workers. This practice potentially
leaves workers better off if they are 
able to earn the same amount as before
by working fewer hours at a higher
wage. However, there is no current em-
pirical evidence to support or refute this
hypothesis. Economists have also sug-
gested that employers may replace
labor with capital over the long run in
response to minimum wage hikes, in
which case the true impact of a mini-
mum wage increase cannot be observed
for several years.
Employers may raise prices as well
as reduce employment when the mini-
mum wage increases. This effect has
been documented in fast-food prices,
which is not surprising since most
restaurant employees’ wages are near
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REEXAMININGTHEMINIMUMWAGEthe minimum wage. Several researchers
have found that a 10-percent increase 
in the minimum wage is correlated 
with a 1-percent increase in fast-food
prices. Minimum wage increases can
contribute to inflation through two
channels: firms may raise prices to re-
coup higher labor costs, and workers
earning higher incomes may raise aggre-
gate demand, creating further upward
pressure on prices.
Is There a Better Way?
The historical basis of the minimum
wage was to prevent the exploitation of
labor. Proponents of the federal mini-
mum argue that it is still needed almost
60 years after its creation to ensure a 
living wage. Although the wage floor
does raise wages for some workers, it
can also reduce employment opportuni-
ties and raise prices. Minimum wage
supporters often argue that the poverty-
reducing effects of the minimum wage
outweigh the potential small disemploy-
ment effects. However, most minimum
wage workers are not from impover-
ished families, and the least skilled,
lowest wage workers are the most likely
to be laid off when the minimum wage
is increased.
There are better ways for govern-
ment to help the working poor, particu-
larly those who are supporting families.
One option is to use tax policy to en-
sure that workers earn at least the
poverty level for their household. The
minimum wage could be replaced by a
combination of tax credits and a nega-
tive income tax. This approach has 
several advantages. A tax policy could
easily be targeted to help only workers
from poor families instead of benefit-
ing all workers regardless of need.
While the minimum wage acts as a tax
on businesses that hire low-skilled
workers, an alternative program could
be funded with general tax revenues. 
A tax-based policy can be both more
equitable and more efficient than the
minimum wage.
In addition, a tax-based policy would
offer low-skilled workers greater oppor-
tunity to acquire job-market experience.
The minimum wage can be a disincen-
tive for firms to hire low-skilled work-
ers, reducing the ability of workers to
get a foot in the door and learn skills
through on-the-job training. Of course,
a primary disadvantage of eliminating
the minimum wage is that some firms
might be able to exploit workers and
pay them below-market wages.
The United States already has a pol-
icy similar to the one outlined above:
the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC),
which provides a wage subsidy to 
low-income workers with dependents.
In 1996, for example, a worker who has
two children and earns less than $8,890
receives a 40-percent wage subsidy
under the EITC. Benefits are phased out
as earnings increase and families rise
above the poverty level. Unlike the
minimum wage, the program only 
benefits low-income workers, and the
benefit is based partially on family size.
The EITC also can move more working
families with only one wage earner out
of poverty than can the minimum
wage.
3
Given that programs like the EITC
are a better way to “make work pay”
than the minimum wage, why do we
continue to have a minimum wage? 
Surveys show the vast majority of the
American public supports the minimum
wage. Politicians support it because it
offers a way to redistribute income
through an indirect tax on businesses,
whereas tax-based programs such as
the EITC require government funding in
an era of budget deficits. Some mem-
bers of Congress have recently even
called for reducing the EITC to reduce
government expenditures. Unless the
public and politicians recognize that a
taxed-based program is a better way to
help the working poor, the federal min-
imum wage policy almost certainly will
continue to exist.
—Madeline Zavodny
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Page  15
Notes
1 Economists focus on the effect of the minimum wage on employment
instead of on unemployment since the minimum wage potentially 
affects labor supply as well as employment. Several studies have
found that teen labor supply falls when the minimum wage increases,
and, therefore, teen unemployment can decline even though the teen
employment falls.
2 Dynamic monopsony, a variant of the monopsony model, is another
theory for why employment might increase when the minimum wage
rises. In this model, the minimum wage helps solve imperfect infor-
mation problems. In one plausible version of the dynamic monop-
sony model, an increase in the minimum wage raises employment by
reducing labor turnover.
3 A worker with two children earning the minimum wage of $4.25 in
1996 would have earned $8,840 annually. A minimum wage of $5.15
raises the family’s income to $10,712, while the current EITC pro-
gram raises it to $12,376. The poverty level for this family was
$12,278 in 1995.
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“A tax-based policy can be both more equitable and more 
efficient than the minimum wage.”A COMMENTARYFROMTHEPRESIDENT
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he Dallas Fed’s recent conference on exchange rate
policy rules and the tequila effect of the Mexican peso
crisis took me back to graduate school and my early
years at the Fed. In those days—the late 1960s—the
Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates was on
its last legs, and the intellectual case for flexible ex-
change rates was gaining ascendancy.
An important argument for flexible exchange rates was that
they would better insulate domestic economies from external
disturbances and provide greater independence for domestic
monetary policies. A related claim was that flexible exchange
rates would render sticky domestic prices and wages flexible
in terms of foreign currencies and thus make international 
adjustments less harmful to domestic employment. Real wages
could adjust without a change in nominal wages.
As I recall, the key to whether flexible rates would perform
as touted was the international dominance of trade over capi-
tal accounts. Back then, nations traded and capital adjusted 
to keep overall payments in balance, at least in theory. Nowa-
days, capital flows dominate, and trade does much of the 
adjusting. In any case, the recent experiences of Mexico and
Argentina bring many of the old issues back to the forefront.
Rather than use flexible exchange rates to achieve insula-
tion and policy independence, Mexico in 1989 began using
semifixed rates—a crawling peg—to achieve policy depen-
dence. The idea was that Mexico could import greater price
stability from the United States than it could achieve on its
own. The central bank thus used the exchange rate as its prin-
cipal instrument of monetary policy to reduce inflation. That
policy—combined with free market reforms, privatization of
state-owned enterprises and an opening of Mexican markets
to the world—was remarkably successful prior to the finan-
cial crisis that culminated in December 1994. Many econo-
mists and others have second-guessed Mexican monetary
policies during 1994. However, it seems clear to me that the
primary and proximate cause of the capital flight that depleted
reserves and prompted devaluation was not economic funda-
mentals but rather political uncertainty stemming from the
Chiapas uprising and two political assassinations.
Argentina used its currency board arrangement—intended
to fix the country’s exchange rate at parity to the U.S. dollar—
to renounce independent domestic monetary policies and 
tie the fate of its economy to the dollar. This arrangement was
more rigid than was the Mexican arrangement, presumably
because of Argentina’s recent history of hyperinflation with its
implications for credibility. Argentine policymakers found it
necessary to burn their bridges behind them, so to speak.
Once the financial crisis hit both countries, the different
outcomes were instructive. Mexico’s progress on inflation was
eroded by an unintendedly large devaluation, but the devalu-
ation at least sowed the seeds of recovery from the resulting
sharp recession. The Mexican economy began to recover after
only six months. Argentina’s exchange rate and low inflation
rate held, but at the expense of a banking crisis and a sharp,
lingering recession. Furthermore, under the currency board
rule, Argentina has no policy tools to combat the still very
high unemployment rate. But given that inflation has been a
historically intractable problem in Argentina, that trade-off
may well be the correct one for that country.
At the conclusion of our conference, I was asked to sum-
marize some of the “tequila lessons” from a policymaker’s per-
spective. One lesson from both countries’ experience is that
basically sound economic policies are no guarantee of suc-
cess. Another lesson is that, operating in the fog of uncer-
tainty, policymakers can never quite know how close they are
to the edge of a cliff or how far the fall might be. The appro-
priateness of Mexican monetary policies during 1994 can be
second-guessed, but foresight is never as good as hindsight.
Another obvious lesson is that once the viability of a fixed
exchange rate comes into question, it’s usually too late to save
it. So, no matter how beneficial the fixed rate may have been
before the crisis, its demise is usually very costly. Had Mexico
had a more flexible rate in the early 1990s, it probably would
have been somewhat less successful initially in reducing in-
flation, but the peso’s depreciation during 1994 would proba-
bly have been much less severe. Mexico’s more recent
experience confirms for me the advantages of flexibility. Its
peso had settled in at a stable rate of about 7.5 to the dollar
for many months, which involved an appreciation in real
terms since Mexican inflation exceeded that of its trading part-
ners. The rate has recently adjusted to about 8 to 1 in a
smooth transition without a crisis.
Argentina’s current dilemma illustrates another policy lesson:
the importance of credibility in government and central bank
policies. During our August conference, Argentina’s policy-
makers were proposing a tax increase in the midst of high un-
employment because they felt they had to reduce their budget
deficit to shore up credibility. When credibility is in doubt,
policies have to be tougher, or even sometimes perverse, to
sustain trust. With credibility, policymakers can be less severe
without adverse market reaction. Because of the credibility
issue, Argentina’s ironclad system of fixed exchange rates is
probably necessary and appropriate there. For the United
States and, I believe, for Mexico, greater flexibility is desirable.
A final policy lesson brought home to me by the Mexican
crisis is just how important correct and credible policies are to
our standard of living. Small policy mistakes can lead to hor-
rible results both at home and abroad. In the United States,
with our tradition of greater stability, the markets are more
forgiving, and we can easily forget the human suffering bad
policies can cause.
President and CEO, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
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HE IMPACT OF the 1994–95 Mexican peso crisis rip-
pled through South America in a wave later dubbed
the tequila effect. The crisis caught many countries 
off-guard, especially those, like Argentina, that had
implemented ironclad policy rules intended to prevent
such financial problems. In the case of Mexico, it was
an exchange rate policy rule intended to foster price stability
that ultimately proved unsustainable, with calamitous conse-
quences.
Under what circumstances can such rules be sustained?
And what special problems do they engender for the coun-
tries that adopt them? These
topics were addressed in “Pol-
icy Rules and Tequila Lessons,”
a conference sponsored by 
the Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas’ Center for Latin Ameri-
can Economics and the Uni-
versidad Torcuato Di Tella in
Buenos Aires on August 12–13.
The central issue addressed 
at the conference was the sus-
tainability of fixed exchange
rate systems.
Only weeks before the con-
ference, Argentine Minister of
Economy Domingo Cavallo
had stepped down amid grow-
ing concerns about the via-
bility and desirability of that
country’s policy rules. As Cav-
allo delivered the opening address to the conference, defend-
ing the success of those policies, his successor, Roque
Fernández, was proposing tax increases aimed at buttressing
their credibility in the midst of 17-percent unemployment.
Argentina and the Currency Board Rule
To keep a fixed exchange rate as an anchor against infla-
tion, Argentina since 1991 has adhered to a rule for printing
currency called a currency board rule. Under such a rule, a
country selects a foreign currency, such as the U.S. dollar or
the German mark, and a fixed rate at which domestic cur-
rency can be exchanged for this foreign currency. In the case
of Argentina, the exchange rate was fixed at one peso per U.S.
dollar. Then the currency board, which effectively replaces
the discretionary policies of a central bank, prints at a fixed
T
exchange rate only enough domestic currency to equal the
country’s foreign currency reserves. If this rule is strictly fol-
lowed, then at any time, the currency board is able to buy
back any or all of the domestic currency using foreign re-
serves at the fixed exchange rate. This policy is meant to safe-
guard against currency devaluations but works only as long as
the government maintains the currency board rule.
Under such a rule, the government, in essence, ties its own
hands. And although this approach can lead to price level sta-
bility, ex post, circumstances often arise that tempt the gov-
ernment to abandon the currency board rule. For example, if
a government’s debt is becoming
increasingly large relative to
gross domestic product (GDP),
raising the taxes necessary to pay
the interest on the debt becomes
more difficult. The government
then has an incentive to monetize
the debt — that is, to print money
to pay the government’s credi-
tors — and in so doing, to violate
the currency board rule.
More likely, however, before
monetization occurs, investors
will notice the increasing debt
and anticipate a devaluation.
Fearing the losses that would re-
sult from a devaluation or seek-
ing to profit from it, these
investors could launch a specula-
tive attack against the country’s
currency, selling the domestic currency to buy foreign cur-
rency. The consensus reached at the conference was that, to
avert fears of a devaluation, a country following a currency
board rule must keep a balanced fiscal budget over time by
compensating for fiscal deficits with fiscal surpluses.
On this score, Argentina has been running a series of fiscal
deficits that are too large to prevent the growth of debt as a
percentage of GDP. The need to allay investors’ fears of de-
fault or inflation was what motivated Argentina’s new minis-
ter of economy to propose tax increases despite the country’s
recent severe recession and a continued 17-percent unem-
ployment rate.
Argentina’s struggles with the currency board reflect a key
lesson from the conference: monetary and fiscal policies are
inextricably intertwined. It is impossible to maintain a fixed
exchange rate system without the corresponding support of
fiscal policy, as Thomas Sargent stressed in his presentation,
Policy Rules and Tequila Lessons:
Conclusions from an Economic Conference
Domingo Cavallo, former Argentine Minister of the Economy (left),
opened the conference with remarks about his country's efforts to
uphold its currency board rule. Dallas Fed President Bob McTeer
(right) was a conference cohost.“Stabilization Plans and the Feasibility and Credibility of
Macroeconomic Policies.” Sargent is an economics professor
at Stanford University and the University of Chicago.
In a related contribution, University of Minnesota Professor
Timothy Kehoe, discussing his research with Harold Cole of
the Minneapolis Fed, argued that in addition to the size of the
government debt, the maturity structure of the debt is impor-
tant in maintaining the credibility of a fixed exchange rate sys-
tem. A concentration of short-term debt must be accompanied
by the ability to increase tax revenues substantially in the
short run. Otherwise, investors may speculate that the gov-
ernment will not be able to repay its debt.
This was the case in Mexico, where the stock of
tesobonos—dollar-denominated bonds issued by the Mexican
government—that would fall due between December 1994
and May 1995 represented 10 percent of Mexican GDP. In-
vestors reasoned that Mexico could not raise the necessary
taxes in just six months in the event the tesobonos could not
be rolled over into another debt instrument. Investors’ fear of
default on tesobonos contributed to a run on Mexican debt
and currency that culminated in the December 1994 peso de-
valuation and the abandonment of Mexico’s fixed exchange
rate system. Political events also may have been involved in
the run against the tesobonos.
Banking Stability and the Lender of Last Resort
Another aspect of fixed exchange rate systems discussed at
the conference was the constraint a fixed exchange rate puts
on the government’s role as a lender of last resort; printing
money to bail out troubled financial institutions violates a cur-
rency board rule. Although a government may vow not to act
as a lender of last resort, it usually does so in the midst of a
financial crisis. Therefore, it is better to decide and announce
in advance the explicit conditions under which it may or will
not do so. In particular, it is important to decide whether
money creation and the inflation tax or legislated taxes will be
used to fund the system. Thus, the issue of lender of last re-
sort, traditionally an aspect of monetary policy, is ultimately
an issue of fiscal policy as well.
Paradoxically, the availability of a lender of last resort ser-
vices can make a financial system more prone to crises if it
causes financial institutions to take more risks than they
would otherwise. In addressing this moral hazard dilemma,
conferees agreed that governments can do little to resolve it
through regulation. Brown University Professor Peter Garber
pointed out that the ever-increasing complexity of financial
derivatives markets may prevent even the most skillful regu-
lators from distinguishing between conservative financial be-
havior and leveraged operations with substantial hidden
currency risk.
Columbia University Professor Charles Calomiris, even less
optimistic about what governments can do, advocated private
disciplining mechanisms. One mechanism he proposed was
the use by banks of subordinated debt, debt that is not in-
sured by government. Banks would be required to issue a
minimum amount of uninsured debt. When a bank closed, the
government would cover depositor losses by liquidating the
bank’s assets. Holders of the subordinated debt would receive
what was left. Thus, the buyers of the debt would have a
strong incentive to promote conservative lending and invest-
ment decisions by banks to protect their investment.
In any case, as Professor Alan Stockman of the University
of Rochester emphasized, the stability of the banking system
should be a key factor in the choice of an exchange rate sys-
tem. Fixed exchange rates are harder to maintain in countries
with historically unstable banking systems. A fragile banking
sector leads to frequent bailouts, expenditures that make it
difficult to achieve the balanced budget policy that ultimately
supports fixed exchange rate systems.
Conclusion
The lessons of the conference underscore the fact that
there is no quick and easy fix for a country’s currency insta-
bility. Dallas Fed President Bob McTeer summarized these
lessons in his postconference remarks to the Buenos Aires
Stock Exchange: “The conference presentations were all con-
sistent with the emerging consensus within the economics
profession that the long-term benefits of economic liberaliza-
tion, including open capital markets, are worth the short-term
costs. They also confirmed the importance of having stable,
credible and predictable government policies in place. Were it
not for these two factors, the negative impacts stemming from
the Mexican peso devaluation—the tequila effect—would
have been much worse for Argentina.”
— Sheila Dolmas
Carlos Zarazaga
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BEYONDTHEBORDERFurther Information on the Data
For more information on employment
data, see “Reassessing Texas Employment
Growth” (Southwest Economy, July/August
1993). For TIPI, see “The Texas Industrial 
Production Index” (Dallas Fed Economic 
Review, November 1989). For the Texas
Leading Index and its components, see 
“The Texas Index of Leading Indicators: 
A Revision and Further Evaluation” (Dallas
Fed  Economic Review, July 1990).
Online economic data and articles are
available on the Dallas Fed’s BBS, Fed Flash,
(214) 922-5199 or (800) 333-1953, and WWW
home page, www.dallasfed.org.
Thousands of persons July–September 1996 Index, January 1981 = 100
Total Nonfarm Employment
Index, January 1991 = 100
Texas Leading Index and Nonfarm Employment Net Contributions of Components to Change in Leading Index
Texas Industrial Production Index (TIPI)
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FTER SOLID GROWTH in the second quarter,
Eleventh District employment growth slowed in the
third quarter, resuming a cooling trend that has 
been in place since employment growth peaked 
in 1994. Several factors are restraining current eco-
nomic growth: a tight labor market, slower national
economy and brief second-quarter jump in mortgage rates
that has led to slower homebuilding and weaker demand for
construction-related manufacturing.
After 2.9-percent annual job growth in the second quarter,
District employment growth slowed to 1.6 percent in the third
quarter. The slowdown in employment growth was broad-
based across industries. After rising 2.3 percent in the second
quarter, manufacturing employment fell 1.3 percent in the
third quarter. Private-service sector growth also slowed
A
Regional Economic Indicators
Texas employment Total nonfarm employment
Texas Private
Leading TIPI Construc- Manufac- Govern- service- New
Index total Mining tion turing ment producing Texas Louisiana Mexico
9/96 117.0 123.1 155.0 435.0 1,055.2 1,468.8 5,154.2 8,268.2 1,804.9 715.2
8/96 116.7 123.3 155.0 433.3 1,056.4 1,473.4 5,149.6 8,267.7 1,798.6 717.8
7/96 116.1 122.7 154.7 432.7 1,053.5 1,462.1 5,140.6 8,243.6 1,797.9 718.8
6/96 116.2 123.0 155.7 432.3 1,053.7 1,457.9 5,136.0 8,235.6 1,793.6 717.5
5/96 116.6 122.2 155.9 431.5 1,052.7 1,456.9 5,116.3 8,213.3 1,793.5 716
4/96 116.8 122.2 155.6 430.5 1,051.7 1,455.3 5,097.7 8,190.8 1,792.2 712.2
3/96 116.1 122.0 156.1 429.9 1,049.1 1,453.2 5,077.1 8,165.4 1,793.1 711.4
2/96 115.0 120.6 155.6 428.5 1,047.3 1,452.7 5,064.5 8,148.6 1,794.0 711.8
1/96 113.8 120.5 154.7 424.6 1,044.7 1,451.0 5,055.8 8,130.8 1,795.3 710.1
12/95 113.3 119.6 154.2 420.1 1,039.1 1,460.9 5,067.2 8,141.5 1,788.1 702.1
11/95 113.5 119.6 154.3 416.2 1,034.4 1,457.2 5,048.4 8,110.5 1,788.4 699.5
10/95 114.4 119.8 154.9 413.5 1,031.3 1,455.3 5,025.6 8,080.6 1,788.2 694.8
s
sharply. After expanding 3.9 percent in the second quarter,
private-service-sector employment rose only 1.2 percent in the
third quarter.
A tight labor market may have restrained employment
growth, particularly in Texas, where job growth has outpaced
the nation’s for the past decade and outpaced the state’s long-
run average for the past three years. Texas’ statewide unem-
ployment rate dipped to 5.4 percent in September, just slightly
above the U.S. unemployment rate of 5.2 percent. However,
if cities along the Texas–Mexico border—where heavy immi-
gration keeps unemployment rates high—are excluded, the
Texas unemployment rate would drop to 4.7 percent.
—Fiona Sigalla
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Fourth-Quarter Results Are In
Economists present empirical research into three timely issues 
in the Dallas Fed’s fourth-quarter of Economic Review. Economic
Review is a quarterly journal that takes a policy-oriented approach
to thought-provoking economic issues. Free subscriptions and indi-
vidual copies are available on request by calling 1-800-333-4460 
or 1-214-922-5254, or you may fax your name and address to 
214-922-5268.
Neighborhood School Characteristics: What Signals Quality 
to Homebuyers? by Kathy J. Hayes and Lori L. Taylor
Hayes and Taylor examine whether the property values of homes in the
Dallas Independent School District reflect the characteristics of the
neighborhood school, test scores and school expenditures.
Trade Deficits: Causes and Consequences by David M. Gould and Roy J. Ruffin
Gould and Ruffin review the conventional wisdom surrounding trade balances and investigate whether large
overall trade deficits or bilateral trade imbalances are associated with lower rates of economic growth.
Can Mortgage Applications Help Predict Home Sales? by John V. Duca
Duca investigates the Mortgage Bankers Association index of home mortgage applications to discover if it
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